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SPEECH

THE CORPORATION COUNSEL'S VIEW OF
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT*
PAUL CROTTY**

With the Speaker of the City Council' coming before this audience
today, I thought it would be important to have another point of view on
the topic of separation of powers in the City government. This is an
important issue. In the press it is portrayed as acrimonious and divisive,
but it is not.
Between the two branches of government, the legislative branch and
the executive branch in the city of New York, there is, I think, a healthy
tension. This tension is inherent in the division of power and produces a
dynamic that is beneficial to all.
Our "separation of powers" in City government is not quite as clear
as that under the Federal Constitution, but we have a Charter, 2 and the
phrase I like to use with Deputy Mayor Power is: Is it "chartertutional"
or "unchartertutional"?
In addition to our Charter, we have the state Municipal Home Rule
Law,4 we have the state Finance Law' and we have various local laws;
so it is not always clear where power lies for a particular purpose in the
City. But it is clear that, in the last analysis, power always exists
someplace-and for it to be properly exercised it has to be accountable.
As part of the healthy tension I have described, there arise from time
to time some especially contentious issues. We have one of those issues
* Mr. Crotty delivered these remarks extemporaneously at a symposium sponsored
by the New York Law School Law Review in conjunction with the New York Law
School Center for New York City Law on March 30, 1995 entitled Police Corruption,
Municipal Corruption: Cures at What Cost? [hereinafter Symposium]. The footnotes
accompanying these remarks were added by the editors of the New York Law School
Law Review.
** Corporation Counsel for the City of New York.
1. Peter F. Vallone, Speaker of City Council. Mr. Vallone spoke at the Symposium
advocating the City Council's Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board.
2. N.Y. CrrY CHARTER (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995).
3. Peter J. Powers, First Deputy Mayor under Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani.
4. N.Y. MUN. HoLM RULE LAW art. 1, et seq. (McKinney 1994).
5. N.Y. STATE FiN. LAv art. 1, et seq. (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995).
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before us right now. This particular issue arises from an assertion of
power by the Council 6 where we believe no power exists. 7

I was lucky enough to hear some of the remarks that the Speaker of

the City Council made here earlier. He said that Mayor Giuliani was at

risk of creating a misimpression that he is above the law.8 The Speaker
said that the Mayor's actions send a chilling message to all citizens who
expect elected officials to not only uphold laws but to obey them as well. 9
And I must tell you that the Mayor, of course, takes his oath of office
very, very seriously. He has pledged to uphold the law.
And just as the law is binding on the Mayor, it is binding on the City
Council as well. For example, in November the Council tried to adopt its

own budget in mid-year.1" We had to ask a court to remind the City
Council that it was not empowered to enact its own budget in the middle

of the year."' It can do that at the beginning of the fiscal year, but in the
middle of the fiscal year its powers are more limited.12 As you probably
know, the court annulled the Council's actions. 3
6. In January, 1995 the Council enacted Local Law No. 13 which created the
Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board. This Board was to be made up of five
members, two of whom would be appointed by the Council, two by the Mayor, and the
fifth member to be jointly appointed by the Mayor and the Speaker of the City Council.
N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13 §§ 1, 450 (Jan. 19, 1995).
7. Because the Council, under Local Law 13, is empowered to appoint two of the
five members of the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board, the Council
attempted to curtail the Mayor's power under the New York City Charter to appoint "the
heads of administrations, departments, all commissioners and all other officers not
elected by the people, except as otherwise provided by law." Compare N.Y., N.Y.,
Local Law 13 § 450 (Jan. 19, 1995) with N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch.1, § 6 (Williams Press
1986 & Supp. 1995).
8. See Peter F. Vallone, Speech: The City Council's View ofindependent Oversight
of the Police Department, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 13 (1995).
9. Id. at 17.
10. See Council of New York v. Giuliani, 163 Misc. 2d 681, 691-92. (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1994) (holding that the Council's attempt to adopt budget modifications mid-year was
unlawful).
11. Id. (holding that the City Council can only enact a budget in the middle of the
year if the Mayor initiates a budget modification proposal).
12. Id. at 684-85. The court stated that at the beginning of the fiscal year, the
Council has the authority to "increase, decrease, add or omit any unit of appropriation
for personal service or other than personal service" and may override a mayoral veto of
those changes within ten days. Id. at 685. In the middle of the fiscal year, the Council's
power is limited to disapproval of budget modifications within thirty days of the stated
meeting following the receipt of notice. Id.
13. Id. at 691-92
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The division of power between the Mayor and the Council is
important, and it is important to maintain that division of power if we
want to have a system of government that is wise and can survive the test

of time.
With regard to the independent commission which the City Council
has created, I think that it is important to remember that the five District
Attorneys-the five elected District Attorneys in New York City, one from
each county-and the two U.S. Attorneys, have all gone on public record
to state that the City Council's legislation is not the best exercise of the
City Council's power. The Speaker of the City Council passes that off as
a parochial concern about funding and resources and suggests that they are
just concerned about who is going to have power.14 However, the fact
of the matter is that when seven prosecutors, each of whom is
independent, say that there is something wrong,15 I think all of us ought
to stand back and say, maybe they are right. This is part of a dialogue
that ought to go on in public.
It is not necessarily divisive to allow for debate, and I think that the
City Council ought to listen to such objections. However, rather than deal
with those objections, the City Council's bill has simply proposed a series
of protocols to be executed after the law takes effect.16 Protocols are
designed to instill cooperation. But the fact of the matter is that you
cannot legislate cooperation in order to resolve the complicated law
enforcement issues raised by the prosecutors. 7 We ought to have a
careful construct and-rather than just saying, "We can't think this out,
go figure it out yourself and adopt a protocol," which is essentially what
the legislation does-we would prefer to pursue this matter on a more
careful basis.
14. See Vallone, supra note 8.
15. Leonard Levitt, PoliceActions Speak Volumes, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 17, 1994,
at 20.
16. Local Law 13, which created the Independent Police Investigation and Audit
Board, recommends that protocols with the Police Department, District Attorneys and
Civilian Complaint Review Board be established, whereby information shall be
exchanged and cooperation facilitated between the Board and the various law enforcement
agencies. N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13, § 457(a)-(c) (Jan. 19, 1995).
17. Levitt, supranote 15, at A20 (stating that the District and U.S. Attorneys fear
that investigations by the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board will interfere
with their own investigations). In his message accompanying the veto of Local Law 13,
Mayor Giuliani explained that the common concern of the prosecutors is that the broad
investigative powers of the Board will pose serious confficts among the police, the City,
and others combatting and investigating corruption, as well as present safety risks.
Mayor's Veto Message, excerpted in N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1994, § 1, at 28.
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Now, I think that there is substantial agreement between the Mayor
and the Council on a number of important aspects of this issue. First of
all, we believe, as the Mollen Commission 8 believed and as the City
Council says it believes in its legislative findings, that a large majority of
the members of the Police Department are decent men and women who
are pledged to the rule of law, and who believe in carrying out their
functions with honesty, honor, valor and integrity. We agree with that.
We also agree that the hazards of corruption are great and that there
has to be a vigilant monitoring of those efforts to ensure that corruption
is nipped in the bud. I think the Mollen Commission, the Mayor, and the
City Council acknowledge that in the past there have been some
deficiencies and that there has to be a renewed commitment from time to
time to make sure that there is a vigorous, ongoing anti-corruption effort
in the Police Department.
After all, as Commissioner Murphy suggested earlier today, 9 it is
vital to our democracy to have a well maintained police force which
represents the community view as to how its laws, democratically adopted,
should be enforced.'
Integrity is critical, and I am glad that the
Council, the Mayor, and the Mollen Commission agree on this important
point. The question now is, how is that to be served? We believe that it
is best served by the terms of the Mayor's Executive Order 18.21
The Speaker of the City Council quoted from that portion of the
Executive Order which says the Police Department remains responsible for
conducting investigations of specific allegations of corruption made against
the Department,' and that the Commission

18. The Mollen Commission was created in July, 1992, pursuant to Executive Order
42 of then-Mayor David N. Dinkins, to investigate the nature and extent of corruption
in the Poliee Department, to evaluate the Department's procedures for preventing and
detecting corruption, and to recommend changes and improvements. N.Y. CITY COMM'N
TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION

PROC. OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMM'N REP. 1 (July 7, 1994) (Milton Mollen, Chair)
[hereinafter MOLLEN COMM'N REP.].
19. Patrick V. Murphy was New York City Police Commissioner from 1970 to
1973. Mr. Murphy spoke at the Symposium on March 30, 1995. See Patrick V.
Murphy, Speech: Police Corruptionand the Need for Leadership, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 65 (1995).
20. See id.
21. N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 18 (Feb. 27, 1995) (establishing a five-member
commission, appointed by the Mayor, to investigate possible corruption within the Police
Department).
22. Vallone, supra note 8, at 19-20 (quoting N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 18, § 3(b)).
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shall not investigate such matters except where the Commission
and the Commissioner of the City Department of Investigation,
with the approval of the Mayor, determine that exceptional
circumstances exist in which the assessment of the Police
Department's anti-corruption systems requires the investigation of
an underlying allegation of corruption made against Police
Department personnel.'
And, I think, the Speaker of the Council, after having read those
provisions said, "Come on." Well, I will agree with him. I say, "Come
on" too. "Come on and let's get real." "Come on and let's analyze the
facts."
The fact of the matter is that in the division of power that exists,
power has to be accountable. And while the Speaker of the Council talks
about the independence of this commission that he has created, the fact of
the matter is that it is independent of the Mayor, it is independent of the
City Council, it is independent of everyone, and therefore is not
accountable.
If we look back at the successes of the Mollen Commission, I think
all of us will recognize that it was appointed by the Mayor and it was
independent of the Police Department-but it was not independent of the
Mayor.' Unlike the Mollen Commission and the commission that the
Mollen Commission suggested ought to be continued,25 the Independent
Police Investigation and Audit Board,1 with members evenly appointed
by the City Council and the Mayor,' is independent of the Mayor and
independent of the City Council.' It exists on its own.
It is fine to have the Board independent of the Police Department; no
one quarrels with that. However, should it be independent of the Mayor?
It is the Mayor who under the Charter is charged with ensuring efficiency
23. N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 18, § 39(b) (Feb. 27, 1995).
24. N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 42, § 2 (July 24, 1992) (establishing the Mollen
Commission, in which the five members of the Commission were appointed by thenMayor David N. Dinkins).
25. MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 18, at 152-154 (recommending the creation
of a permanent external police commission independent of the Police Department, while
still remaining accountable to and appointed by the Mayor).
26. See N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13, § 450 (Jan. 19, 1995).
27. Id.
28. See generally N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13 (Jan. 19, 1995) (enumerating the
powers of the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board and specifically granting
the Board the power to undertake independent investigations of possible police
corruption).
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and integrity in government." It is the Mayor who appoints the Police
Commissioner.' The Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board,

appointed in part by the City Council31 is in derogation of those duties
and responsibilities. 2 It is in derogation of the Mayor's powers.
Under the City Charter, and under the state Municipal Home Rule
Law,33 a local law which would curtail the power of the Mayor or of

another elected office-holder requires the approval of the electorate.'
In other words, it must be approved by referendum? 5 So our objection
to this bill enacted by the City Council, and a key reason for the Mayor's
29. N.Y. Crry CHARTER ch. 1, § 8(a) (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995):
The mayor shall be responsible for the effectiveness and integrity of city
government operations and shall establish and maintain such policies and
procedures as are necessary and appropriate to accomplish this responsibility
including the implementation of effective systems of internal control by each
agency and unit under the jurisdiction of the mayor.
Id.
30. See N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 18, § 431(a) (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995)
(empowering the Mayor to appoint a Police Commissioner).
31. N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13, § 450 (Jan. 19, 1995).
32. Compare id. (allowing the City Council to appoint two members to the
Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board) with N.Y. CrrY CHARTER, ch. 1 §§
6(a), 8(a) (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995) (empowering the Mayor to establish
policies and procedures in order to uphold his responsibility for the effectiveness and
integrity of City government operations, and to appoint the heads of administrations,
departments, all commissioners, and all other unelected officials).
33. N.Y. MUN. HoME RULE LAW art. 1, et seq. (McKinney 1994).
34. See N.Y. CriY CHARTER ch. 2, § 38 (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995)
Section 38 states that:
[a] local law shall be submitted for the approval of the electors at the next
general meeting . . . and shall become operative as prescribed therein only
when approved at such election by the affirmative vote of a majority of the
qualified electors of the city voting upon the proposition, if it:
5) Abolishes, transfers or curtails any power of an elective officer.
Id. See also N.Y. MUN. HoME RULE LAW art. 3, § 23(2) (McKinney 1994) ("Except
as otherwise provided by or under authority of a state statute, a local law shall be subject
to mandatory referendum if it ... (f)Abolishes, transfers or curtails any power of an
elective officer.").
35. Id.
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veto,' is that the Mayor's power under Charter section 6 to appoint all
officers of the City would be curtailed.3 7
In addition, the power of the Mayor to run the Police Department

would be curtailed. The power of the Police Commissioner, a mayoral
appointee,3 8

to

be

responsible

for

corruption

would

be

curtailed-notwithstanding statements of legislative intent in the bill to the

contrary.39 While all these forms of curtailments may be lawful if
submitted to a referendum, they cannot be accomplished by the City
Council alone without the approval of the electorate.'
The Speaker of the Council talked about Council appointments to the
Board of Correction41 as a precedent for the type of appointment
structure set forth in the Council's bill.42 Well, I would just like to point
out two things. First of all, the Council's power to appoint members of

the Board of Correction was established pursuant to the 1975 Charter
amendments,43 which were submitted to the vote of the electorate.'

36. Jonathan P. Hicks, Mayor Vetoes Bill Creatinga Panelto Monitor Police, N.Y.
TxMES, Dec. 24, 1994, at 1 (noting Mayor Giuliani's opposition to Local Law 13 which
established the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board).
37. See N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 1, § 6(a) (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995).
Section 6(a) empowers the Mayor to appoint the heads of administrations, departments,
all commissioners and all other officers not elected by the people except as otherwise
provided by the law. Under Local Law 13, the City Council would be entitled to appoint
two of the five members of the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board. Id.
38. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 18, § 431(a) (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995)
(empowering the Mayor to appoint a Police Commissioner).
39. See N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13, § 456 (Jan. 19, 1995) (stating that "It]he
provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to limit or impair the authority of the
police commissioner to investigate corruption within the department, or to discipline
members of the department.").
40. See supra note 34.
41. Vallone, supra note 8. In the transcript of his Symposium remarks, Mr.
Vallone responded to a question by saying that the "City Council [does] have the
authority to make direct appointments [and that they] already make appointments" to the
Board of Correction. Peter F. Vallone, Symposium Transcript: Police Corruption,
Municipal Corruption:Cures at What Cost? 168-69 (Mar. 30, 1995) (copy on file with

the New York Law School Law Review).
42. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 25, § 626(a) (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995)
(giving the City Council the power to appoint three members to the Board of Correction).
See Annette Gordon-Reed, Watching the Protectors:Independent Oversightof Municipal
Law Enforcement Agencies, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 87 (1995) (comparing the Board
of Corrections to the City Council's and the Mayor's proposals for independent oversight
boards for the police).
43. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 25, § 626 (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995).
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Second, the Board of Correction does not exercise executive powers.45

By contrast, the Council's oversight commission would exercise important
executive powers with regard to corruption prevention.'

These issues of curtailment probably would not arise if the City

Council felt that the Police Commissioner was not doing a good job on
narcotics and sought to remove narcotics enforcement from his jurisdiction
or wished to create an independent panel to examine narcotics law
enforcement and deployment strategies. None of those actions would
involve the Council directly in the performance of an executive function.
But here the City Council apparently believes it is empowered under the
Charter to make direct appointments to a body which would fight police
corruption through on-street investigations.' 7 The, limitations on the

Council's power in this area are expressly set forth in the Charter" and
are important because they reflect the fundamental principle that it is the
Mayor, as the City's chief executive, who is accountable for the
The issue is thus
performance of City officers and City agencies.'
vitally important to the proper governance of the City of New York.
I would also like to talk a little bit about the allocation of resources.
This new commission, if it comes into existence, will have a five-member
44. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2, § 38(5) (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995).
45. See N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 25, § 626 (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995)
(empowering the Board of Correction to inspect facilities, inspect records of the

department, propose improvements, evaluate performance, report findings and
recommendations to the Mayor, establish standards and procedures and conduct public
or private hearings and investigations within the jurisdiction of the department).
46. N.Y., N.Y., LocalLaw 13, § 451 (Jan. 19, 1995) (empowering the Independent

Police Investigation and Audit Board to assist the Police Department to formulate and
implement policies and programs to detect and eliminate corruption, and the power to
undertake independent investigations of possible corruption within the Police
Department); see also id. § 450(a) (giving the City Council power of appointment to the
Independent Board).
47. See id. § 451(a)(3) (describing the Independent Police Investigation and Audit
Board's power to "undertake independent investigations of possible corruption within the
police department"); see also id. § 451(a)(4) (giving the Board further power to
"undertake investigations of possible corruption within the police department at the
request of the mayor or the police commissioner.").
48. N.Y. CrIY CHARTER ch. 2, § 29 (Williams Press 1986 & Supp. 1995) (listing
the City Council's powers of investigation and oversight and excluding any mention of
the power to make appointments); see also id. oh. 1, § 6(a) (giving the Mayor the power
to appoint the heads of administrations, departments, all commissioners and all other
unelective officials).
49. Id. ch.1, § 8(a) (which states that the Mayor is responsible for the effectiveness
and integrity of City government).
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board. 50 It will also have a staff.5' How large will that staff be? Well,
it may have ten, it may have fifteen, perhaps it is even going to have
twenty-five staff members.
As you know, the City does not have an awful lot of money to spend.
I think it is fair to say that our resources are somewhat depleted these
days. I think it is also fair to say that the resources allocated to the
Independent Commission created by the City Council will never be as
large as the resources in the possession of the five District Attorneys, the
U.S. Attorneys for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and
the Police Department, which has over five hundred police officers
assigned to the Internal Affairs Bureau and a vast network of agents who
monitor corruption on an ongoing basis.
I would also like to point out that over the last eighteen months the
city of New York has had a remarkable record of reducing crime. 2 The
Speaker of the City Council is correct in saying that the Council played
a major role in providing the resources for the hiring of additional
cops-and they are to be commended for that.53 However, the Council
cannot claim any credit, and it does not in fact seek to claim credit, for
how those resources are deployed. That is a matter peculiarly within the
power of the Police Commissioner.'
New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton, utilizing the
powers that he has, has done a terrific job in deploying the manpower he
has on hand to produce a more effective crime control strategy. There is
nothing to suggest that he is not going to be just as vigorous in this area
of corruption-corruption monitoring and educating the men and women
in the Police Department about corruption hazards.
50. N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13, § 450 (Jan. 19, 1995).
51. See id. § 453 (stating that "It]he board is authorized, within appropriations
available therefor, to appoint such employees as are necessary to exercise its powers and
fulfill its duties.").
52. See Clifford Krauss, Bratton Builds His Image As He Rebuilds the Police, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1994, at 1 (stating that homicides were down 18% that year from last,
while robbery and auto thefts are down 15%. Shooting incidents dropped 16% citywide
and 780 fewer people had been killed or wounded by gunfire).
53. See Vallone, supra note 8, at 14 (stating that the City Council legislated the
"Safe Cities, Safe Street" program that put more than 6000 cops on the streets).
54. N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 18, § 434 (1986 & Supp. 1993) (empowering the
Police Commissioner to have control of the government, administration and discipline
of the Police Department, and of the police force, and to be the chief executive officer
of the police force).
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Commissioner Bratton has already begun important initiatives in this

area, 55 and we believe that they ought to be given time to be carried out.

The responsibility for fighting corruption is now and will always be a

matter for the Police Department. After all, when you think about it, a
commission with five members and a staff of fifteen to twenty-five cannot
be nearly as effective as a diligent and vigorous Police Commissioner.
The Mayor's Executive Order recognizes this.'6 The Independent

Commission appointed under the Executive Order has as its primary
function to make sure that the Police Department has an effective, ongoing
anti-corruption effort.5 7 This will be accomplished through vigorous
monitoring and periodic investigations. 1
The City Council's bill

provides for just the reverse. It does not focus so much on the monitoring
function. Instead, it emphasizes active ongoing investigations.

9

Compare for a moment the resources that are available to the
Council's independent oversight board and the Police Department.'
55. See Krauss, supra note 52, at 1 (describing new initiatives introduced by Police
Commissioner Bratton, such as replacing existing commanders, revamping uniforms and
computer systems, and giving his precinct commanders responsibilities previously left to
citywide units).
56. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 18 § 3(b), the Police Department remains
responsible for investigating specific allegations of corruption made against Police
Department personnel. The Commission shall not investigate such matters except where
the Commission and the commissioners of the City Department of Investigation, with the
approval of the Mayor, determine that exceptional circumstances exist in which the
assessment of the Police Department's anti-corruption systems requires the investigation
of underlying allegations of corruption made against Police Department personnel. N.Y.,
N.Y., Exec. Order 18 § 3(b) (Feb. 27, 1995).
57. Id. § 2 (describing the Police Commissioner's duties to monitor both the
performance of anti-corruption systems and agency conditions).
58. Id.
59. In addition to empowering the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board
to "perform assessments and audits of the police department's internal systems for
detecting, investigating and preventing corruption among uniformed and civilian members
of the police force and make recommendations for the improvement of those systems"
and to "assist the police department to formulate and implement policies and programs
to detect and eliminate corruption," Local Law 13 also empowers the Board to
"undertake independent investigations of possible corruption within the police
department; and undertake investigations of possible corruption within the police
department at the request of the Mayor or the Police Commissioner." N.Y., N.Y., Local
Law 13, § 451(1)-(4) (Jan. 19, 1995).
60. See A Useful Deterrent to Corrupt Cops, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at A32
(stating that "[t]he Police Department's Internal Affairs Division is a gargantuan
operation, with enormous resources and a staff of approximately 500. The Audit Board
is envisioned as a modest shop, with a staff of 13 and a budget of only $1 million a
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Consider also the potential for difficulties with other law enforcement
agencies. This is why the District Attorneys and the U.S. Attorneys have
all criticized this proposal 6 -they say it is going to be a land mine for
potential squabbles, for ongoing jurisdictional battles, and for potentially
great conflict.'
I do not think you could run a proper investigation under the City
Council's proposal.
The Council's commission would conduct an
investigation without necessarily informing the Police Commissioner and
without knowing whether the Police Commissioner himself, through the
Internal Affairs Bureau, might already be conducting an investigation in
that particular area. This is not a matter that can be straightened out by
directing that the District Attorneys enter into protocols. Long before
there is a referral to the District Attorney, the Internal Affairs Bureau may
be conducting its own investigation. Unless there is disclosure, there is
real potential for a dangerous clash between investigations.
Let me emphasize: Without letting the Internal Affairs Bureau or the
Police Commissioner know of an investigation, and without some prior
notice to the Department of Investigation, you may very well have this
Independent Commission created by the City Council having their
investigators going out against sworn police officers who are armed. The
potential here for difficulty is very, very great. This is an important
reason why the Mayor has opposed the City Council's initiative.
I think that the Speaker also suggested that the Mayor is acting on his
own here.' I would like to think that after the years that I have spent
in public service and in private practice, I can examine a piece of
legislation and come to an independent determination as to whether or not
it passes muster under the City Charter; whether it is "chartertutional" or
"unchartertutional." The Law Department," without any urging from
the Mayor other than to look at the bill and give it our best opinion, has
come to an independent conclusion that this bill, as enacted by the City
year.").
61. Levitt, supra note 15, at A20.
62. See Mayor's Veto Message, supra note 17.
63. See Vallone, supra note 8, at 17 (stating that "[u]nfortunately the Mayor...
chose to ignore the law and replaced the independent panel with one under his control.
By doing this, he risks giving the impression that he is above the law.").
64. The Law Department was created under chapter 17 of the N.Y. City Charter
and is empowered to "be attorney and counsel for the city and every agency thereof and
shall have charge and conduct of all the law business of the city and its agencies and in
which the city is interested." N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 17, § 394 (Williams Press 1986
& Supp. 1995).
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Council, curtails mayoral powers' and therefore cannot take effect as

part of the Charter of the city of New York without approval by the voters
at referendum.'

We would hope that the conversations, to which the Speaker of the

City Council referred, will continue.67 But if we are not successful in

those discussions, then we will have to resort to the courts.'

It is a by-

product of the healthy tension I described and battles between the

legislature and the executive, whether at the federal, state, or local level,
are sometimes resolved this way. And we, of course, will abide by the
court's decision.
But I think that before it goes forward, the City Council ought to
reconsider its bill, reconsider how appointments are made and reconsider
how it proposes that investigations are to be conducted. They will find

that, first of all, they do not have the power to make these appointments,
and secondly, that the bill contemplates an investigation structure which
is not the wisest and best use of resources.

65. See Mayor's Veto Message, supra note 17 (where the Mayor acknowledged that
he had been advised by the Corporation Counsel that the provisions of the bill would
intrude on the operations of the executive branch).
66. See supra note 34.
67. According to a telephone interview with Richard Weinberg, Chief Counsel to
the New York City Council, the City Council and the Mayor are negotiating to amend
the Council's proposal in order to address the Mayor's concerns. Telephone Interview
with Richard Weinberg, Chief Counsel of the New York City Council (Oct. 11, 1995).
68. Since this speech was delivered, the issue has been litigated. In Mayor of New
York v. Council of New York, the New York State Supreme Court invalidated Local Law
13 because it would otherwise serve to curtail the Mayor's appointment power. Mayor
of New York v. Council of New York, No. 402354, 1995 WL 478872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 30, 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-3710 (1st Dep't N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 16,
1995).

